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ABSTRACT 
While the Hegelian struggle for recognition is often taken to be the systematic point at which 
rational humanity differentiates itself from mere animality, Hegel more thoroughly expounds on 
the relationship between rational and nonrational animals in his Encyclopedia: humans diverge 
from nonrational animals through a process of habituation. While one might assume that Hegel 
takes this power of habituation to be sufficient for rationality, this assumption is complicated by 
Hegel’s attribution of habituation to non-human animals as well. Against readings of the 
Encyclopedia that separate human and non-human animal habituation, I argue that a coherent 
interpretation must treat habituation as the same power in human and non-human animal life. My 
interpretation demonstrates Hegel’s proximity to Matthew Boyle’s transformative conception of 
rationality, which portrays rationality as a unique realization of animality. Hegel takes the 
realization of rational animal life to be thoroughly habitual, contra the instinctual basis of 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The abbreviations I use throughout are as follows:  
DA Aristotle. 2016. De Anima. Translated by Christopher Shields. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
EL Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2005. Logic. Translated by William Wallace. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
PM Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2007. Philosophy of Mind. Translated by A.V. Miller 
and W. Wallace. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
PN Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2004. Philosophy of Nature. Translated by A.V. Miller, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
PR Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1991. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Translated 
by H.B. Nibset. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
PS  Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. 
Miller. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Hegel’s works will be cited by abbreviation and section number (§). When applicable, they will 
be followed by an “A” or “Z” to denote the inclusion of a Remark or Zuzatz section, 
respectively. For instance: “(PM §380/Z)” refers to body paragraph §380 of the Philosophy of 
Mind and its Zuzatz. Additionally, Aristotle’s De Anima is cited by abbreviation and line 
number. For instance, “(DA 433a 3-6)” refers to lines 443a 3 through 443a 6 of Aristotle’s De 
Anima. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Readers of Hegel often interpret the struggle for recognition of the Phenomenology of Spirit as 
the systematic point at which rational humanity differentiates itself from mere animality.1 
However, Hegel expounds on the relationship between rational and nonrational animals more 
thoroughly in his Encyclopedia, focusing on habituation as a necessary aspect of rational life. 
Secondary literature on the Encyclopedia often brings Hegel’s discussion of habitual, second 
nature into dialogue with the second nature of McDowellean naturalism: while all animals are 
sentient, human sapience is unique insofar as, for us, concepts are already, naturally at work in 
rational, perceptual experience (McDowell 1996: 66-70).2 In recent years, these debates have 
shifted focus from the relationship between conceptual and perceptual capacities to a focus on 
rational life, raising the question of how to best distinguish the rational, human form of life from 
its nonrational counterparts.3 The Encyclopedia provides resources for this question as well. 
Specifically, Hegel argues that humans diverge from nonrational animals by obtaining 
consciousness, and thus “self-knowing reason,” through habituation (PM §387).4  
Because Hegel connects habituation to rational life, one might assume that, on his view, 
possessing this power of habituation suffices for the development of rationality. However, this 
assumption is complicated by Hegel’s claim in the Philosophy of Nature that habituation also 
plays a prominent role in nonrational animal life.5 One common strategy for ameliorating this 
tension involves making a distinction between the power of habituation in rational human life 
 
1 Robert Pippin, for instance, characterizes the struggle for recognition as important insofar as it cannot be resolved 
at the “animal level” at which desire governs actions (2011: 82). See Kojève (1993) and Brandom (2019) as well. 
2 See Forman (2010), Levine (2015), and Schuringa (2018). 
3 See Boyle (2012; 2016) and Thompson (2008; 2015). 
4 The Encyclopedia consists of three books. EL indicates the first book of the Encyclopedia, the Logic (Hegel 2005). 
PN indicates the second book, the Philosophy of Nature (Hegel 2004). PM indicates the third book, the Philosophy 
of Mind (Hegel 2007).  
5 Following Hegel, “animal life” and “animality” refer specifically to non-human animals unless otherwise 
specified, e.g., “human animality” or “rational animality.” 
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and its counterpart in merely animal life; in this case, human habituation allows for the 
development of consciousness and, through subsequent developments, human sociality, while 
mere animal habituation simply allows animals to form habits that do not result in developments 
beyond their mere, natural existence. While the results of habituation differ between rational and 
nonrational animals along these lines, Hegel makes no further claim that habituation itself is thus 
a different power for each. Accordingly, I will argue that, according to Hegel, habituation is the 
same, natural power in all animals, but also functions as the necessary basis of rational life, a 
basis exclusive to humans. Habituation is thus a precondition of the crucial struggle for 
recognition between self-conscious beings.  
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I consider whether habituation is regarded as the same 
power in rational and nonrational life in the Encyclopedia. Because Hegel attributes habituation 
to humans and non-human animals, noting the differences between these two attributions will be 
crucial to understanding the life typical of each type of animal. From this discussion, it will 
become evident that, despite Hegel’s divergent discussions of habituation in rational and 
nonrational animal life, the same power of habituation is attributed to each. In Section 3, I 
consider two questions that my interpretation of Hegelian habituation must answer to be 
successful. In my response to these questions, I utilize Matthew Boyle’s distinction between 
additive and transformative theories of rationality. Specifically, by understanding Hegelian 
rationality along the lines of Boyle’s transformative conception of rationality, the tension 
between habituation’s crucial role in rational life and Hegel’s attribution of habituation to 
nonrational animals can be ameliorated: habituation is a power in both rational and nonrational 
animals, but only functions as the basis of rational life, contra instinct as the basis of nonrational 
life. In Section 4, I analyze Hegel’s discussion of conflict in both rational and nonrational life. 
3 
With a transformative reading of Hegelian rationality in mind, the significance of human struggle 
becomes clear: while nonrational animals perpetually face contingent violence in nature, conflict 
between humans provides an important, yet impermanent stage in their development as rational 
animals. In Section 5, I respond to a possible objection that reading Hegel along Boyle’s 




















2 HABITUATION IN THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
Normal use of the word “habit” refers to routines we develop: I could be in the habit of saving 
my Word documents regularly, for instance. For Hegel, “habit” becomes a technical term, 
referring to an individual’s power to form habits: for simplicity, I will refer to the power itself as 
habituation and the specific routines formed as habits. Habituation allows individuals to adopt 
routines or responses to their environment that can be employed unreflectively; additionally, 
these habits can be formed reflectively or unreflectively. Because habituation allows an 
individual to unreflectively interact with her surroundings, it is said to render the individual “free 
of” these surroundings, as opposed to being “occupied with them” (PM §410). Accordingly, 
Hegel characterizes habituation as a liberatory power for the individual.  
This preliminary description of habituation as a liberatory power might be taken to 
contradict other descriptions Hegel gives of habituation, specifically his description of 
habituation as a “mechanism,” which carries the connotation that an individual’s habits are acted 
on unfreely (PM §410/A). Some argue that habituation can be coherently understood as both 
liberatory and mechanistic, citing Hegel’s claims that the unfreedom involved in habituation is 
“partly just formal” and so does not necessarily entail unreflective repetition of behaviors (PM 
§410/A); these readers typically emphasize Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, paying special attention 
to the “Anthropology.”6 On this reading, habits can be formed freely, and while they are 
employed in a mechanistic way, this mechanism liberates the individual from a careful focus on 
the task that has become habitual. Others take Hegel’s description of habituation as mechanism 
to mean that habituation is an important step in human freedom, but does not yet grant the 
complete liberation seen later in human ethical life; these readers emphasize the discussion of 
 
6 See Magrì (2016) and Novakovic (2017; 2019). 
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habituation in ethical life seen in the Philosophy of Right.7 Insofar as the “Anthropology” 
distinguishes human life from the lives of non-human animals, my analysis emphasizes the 
liberatory role of habituation as characterized in the “Anthropology.” While my focus on rational 
and nonrational life-forms justifies an emphasis on the liberatory aspects of habituation, I later 
consider Hegel’s discussion of the habits of ethical life, which demonstrate how habituation, 
even in its most mechanistic uses, can nonetheless be seen as a liberatory power.8 
While this section begins by addressing habituation in the “Anthropology,” which 
features habituation’s prominent role in human life, it also requires turning to the Philosophy of 
Nature, which includes a brief but crucial discussion of habituation relevant to understanding 
Hegel’s distinction between human and non-human animals. Specifically, in “The Animal 
Organism,” Hegel claims that habituation plays an important part in merely animal life.9 Many 
readers of the Encyclopedia, looking primarily to the “Anthropology,” take the importance Hegel 
attributes to habituation in establishing rational life to suggest that the habituation of non-human 
animal life is a different power entirely than habituation of human life.10 However, by analyzing 
habituation in both the “Anthropology” and “The Animal Organism,” I will confirm that in these 
discussions, Hegel offers descriptions of the same power of habituation, albeit a power that 
entails different results for humans and non-human animals. 
 
7 See McCumber (1990) and Menke (2013). The Philosophy of Right describes education as breaking “the resistance 
of the subject” to attain habitual, second nature (PR §151/A). 
8 See Novakovic (2019) for a focused discussion on habituation as a liberatory capacity in human life. 
9 “The Animal Organism” is the final section of the second book of the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of Nature. In 
the third book, the Philosophy of Mind, the first section, “Subjective Mind,” begins with the “Anthropology.”  
10 DeVries (1988), McCumber (1990), and Khurana (2013) distinguish between human and animal habituation in 
Hegel; Merker (2012) and Pinkard (2012) characterize habituation as unique to human life without any mention of 
animal habituation, so they could be understood as taking this position as well. Malabou (2005), Novakovic (2017), 
and Testa (2020) note the pronounced role of habituation in human life, but nonetheless take habituation to be the 
same power in humans and non-human animals. 
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2.1 Habituation in the “Anthropology” 
The “Anthropology” describes the emergence of rational, human life through the stages of 
development of the soul; the soul articulates the organization of a living individual (EL §216). 
For Hegel, humans and non-human animals alike possess subjectivity in virtue of their respective 
souls, but only the former attain the final stage of “actual soul” through habituation (PN §351; 
PM §411).11 In the “Anthropology,” the exigency of habituation for human life is demonstrated 
in habits of inurement and dexterity.12 Habits of inurement are crucial to the development of the 
human soul in particular insofar as they can grant an individual “liberation from sensations” (PM 
§410/A).13 Habits of dexterity, on the other hand, allow individuals to perform trained behaviors 
without reflection. 
Human beings require habits of inurement to mediate their experience of sensations. 
Sensations become an obstacle for the soul at its second stage, “feeling soul,” during which an 
individual’s soul becomes a subject “for itself” (PM §390). The individual takes sensations in as 
feelings and, in doing so, risks immersion “in the particularity of the feelings” (PM §403/A; PM 
§409). Consider renting an apartment next to the highway. Initially, the persistent noise might 
make it difficult to complete any task at home. At the level of soul, Hegel asserts that, were I 
occupied with these sensations indefinitely, their persistence would obstruct my ability to 
maintain an identity independent of feelings: if I am constantly taking in the sights and sounds of 
my environment, and I have no way of mitigating their claim on my attention, Hegel asserts that 
I would never properly be able to maintain a “self” in the first place. This risk of immersion 
necessitates the development of habituation, through which the soul “reduces the particularity of 
 
11 “The notion of life is the soul, and this notion has the body for its reality” (EL §216/Z). Hegel’s discussion of the 
soul tracks the development of a living subject’s embodiment.  
12 Forman (2010) and Levine (2015) detail this distinction between types of habits for Hegel.  
13 Novakovic (2017) elaborates on the relationship between habituation and human freedom. 
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feelings (of consciousness too) to a determination in it that just is” (PM §410). Habituation 
allows an individual to harden against distractions, like the highway, that would otherwise 
consume her self-relation; without this habituation, an individual’s identity would be inseparable 
from the feelings that would otherwise consume her existence. Importantly, inurement to a 
sensation is not identical to a thorough disconnection from the sensation: Hegel describes the 
sensations that the soul habitually inures itself to as “possessions” of the soul, such that the 
individual can return to them, but is crucially “open to other activity and occupations” (PM 
§410). This inurement allows thoroughly habituated individuals to attain the actual soul, in 
which the individual achieves independent identity described as the self-relation of “I … which 
is thus thinking and subject for itself,” or consciousness (PM §412).  
In addition to habitual inurement, Hegel claims that habituation can be expressed in 
“world-directed” activity, as is the case in habits of dexterity.14 For instance, in mastering piano, 
a pianist’s body is “rendered pervious, made into an instrument,” such that she does not have to 
reflect on her posture, the force exerted by her fingers, or knowledge of music theory to perform 
practiced material (PM §410/A). The activity becomes immediate through habituation, as the 
relationship between the activity and the body does not have to be mediated by the individual’s 
reflection; in the case of the pianist, the performance does not require dwelling on the mechanics 
of her playing. By making activities immediate, habituation makes possible a “second nature” for 
the body’s inborn capacities: according to Hegel, such habitual activities have the immediacy of 
natural occurrences, but this immediacy “is an immediacy posited by the soul,” in contrast to 
 
14 Another form of habitual, bodily inurement is “indifference toward satisfactions,” in which habituation to the 
satisfaction of desires dulls the influence of these forces over an individual’s activity (PM §410/A). Here, we can 
think of cravings for certain foods: after consuming enough chocolate, desire for it wanes. Alongside dexterity, the 




natural, built-in behavior (PM §410/A). While habits of inurement mediate an individual’s 
relationship with the external world, habits of dexterity can make mediated activity immediate, 
granting the individual ease in familiar actions.  
Hegel holds that the power of habituation is crucial for the differentiation of humans from 
non-human animals insofar as the former continually shape their responses to and interactions 
with the environment through habituation. The souls of non-human animals do not reach the 
stage of actual soul; for this reason, they do not attain consciousness and are “sunk in the 
individuality and limitation of sensation” (PM §412/Z).15 The importance of the difference 
between the actual, human soul and the limited, animal soul is evident in Hegel’s discussion of 
sight. While sight is a sensation Hegel attributes to animal life, he describes human sight as a 
habitual unity of sensation and several further “determinations”: “seeing,” as a human activity, is 
“the concrete habit which immediately unites in one simple act the many determinations of 
sensation, consciousness, intuition, intellect, etc.” (PM §410/A). Human sight is not a mere 
sensation, but a habit that, by providing an immediate unity to the seeing individual, 
demonstrates the world-directed structure of a habit of dexterity. The determinations united in 
human sight are all aspects of rational, perceptual experience.16 For instance, my consciousness 
of an object entails “the simple, unmediated certainty” of an object as an object distinct from 
myself (PM §418).17 Imagine seeing the LED screen on a microwave oven displaying “0:15.” 
 
15 While Hegel does not explicitly mark any stage of ensoulment as equivalent to the animal soul in the 
“Anthropology,” we might take Hegel to hold that the animal soul is comparable to feeling soul, since developments 
like “self-feeling,” are ascribed both to feeling soul and to animals in The Animal Organism (PN §357; PM §407). 
See Rand (2010) for discussion of the subjectivity Hegel ascribes to non-human animals. 
16 See Houlgate (2016) for discussion of the role of each determination in mature, human sight. 
17 By contrast, Hegel takes nonrational animals to sense their environment in such a way that they do not thoroughly 
distinguish themselves and their ends from other objects: the animal instinctually “impresses its specific nature 
(Bestimmung) on the details of its outer world”: water, for instance, is instinctually related to the animal’s thirst, and 
its “specific qualities” as a distinct entity are assimilated and destroyed in this sensory uptake (PN §362). Pinkard 
describes animal awareness of the world as “a unity of the subjective and the objective,” from which the objective 
cannot be properly distinguished (2012: 28). 
9 
Some determinations at play include your sight of the microwave (sensation), this object’s 
existence as separate from yourself (consciousness), and knowledge of what its timer indicates 
(intellect). Habituation unites these determinations to create one meaningful, perceptual 
experience, such that proper human sight is qualitatively different from the general sensation of 
sight in animal life. 
Hegel claims that habituation “embraces all kinds and stages of mind’s activity” (PM 
§410/A); because habituation enables consciousness in human beings and liberates them from 
sensations, it plays a central role in the establishment of rational life. However, it is difficult to 
characterize this centrality, as Hegel attributes habituation to non-human animal life as well. 
Because Hegel highlights the role of habituation in achieving rationality, some readers of the 
Encyclopedia hold that habituation is either a different power in non-human animals or suggest 
that it does not play a role in animal life at all.18 John McCumber, for instance, argues that 
habituation, in its importance for human mindedness, is indicative of Spirit and thus cannot be 
endured by other animals: habituation does not play a substantive role in non-human animal life 
because the organization granted by habituation is fatal for nonrational animals (1990: 161). 
McCumber takes this to follow from the fact that Hegel invokes animal habituation only when 
describing natural, animal death, in which the individual is said to die as the result of a habit (PN 
§375); because animals are merely natural beings, habituation is not a power that can liberate 
animals from sensations.  
Against readings that separate animal habituation from human habituation, I argue that a 
coherent reading of habituation in the Encyclopedia must treat habituation as the same power for 
rational and nonrational animals. I advance the following interpretation: habituation is the same, 
 
18 See DeVries (1998: 102) and McCumber (1990: 160) for the former view; see Pinkard (2012: 29) and Merker 
(2012: 171) for the latter.  
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essentially nonrational, power in the lives of humans and non-human animals. Accordingly, 
isolated instances of habituation in animal life are not necessarily fatal and operate in a manner 
comparable to that of human life. However, habituation is necessary for the emergence of 
rational life and the states of affairs proper to it. While Hegel holds that habituation becomes 
necessary for nonrational animal life in natural death, this is only one possible form of death; in 
principle, a nonrational animal can go its entire life without forming many habits, and the habits 
it does form will ultimately be in the service of its instinct. In rational life, thorough habituation 
enables the development of consciousness that is necessary for rational human activity in 
general; further, this thorough habituation detailed in the “Anthropology” is proper only in 
rational life (PM §412).  
 
2.2 Habituation in “The Animal Organism” 
In “The Animal Organism,” Hegel provides a picture of animal life in general. To understand 
habituation’s role in merely animal life, we must look to Hegel’s sole mention of animal 
habituation: his discussion of death. Hegel holds that, in general, death begins with a disparity 
between the animal as an individual in nature and the universality of its genus: as a singular 
being, the individual cannot instantiate all aspects of its genus, though the genus nonetheless 
constitutes the form of its life. Additionally, the animal feels this disparity as a defect (PN §368). 
The individual then attempts to remove the disparity, achieving limited, abstract success. Further, 
this attempt to negate the disparity culminates in the individual’s “destruction” (PN §369/Z).  
11 
For animals that avoid all other causes of death, such as violence and disease, there 
remains natural death.19 In natural death, the individual negates its “singular, … finite existence” 
to “[give] its singularity the form of universality”; this negation, referred to as “the inertia of 
habit,” ends the individual’s life process (PN §375). The animal individual, feeling the tension 
between its singularity and its genus, attempts to actualize the universality of its genus in its 
singular body through habituation. In doing so, the animal “dies from the habit of life, in that it 
lives itself into its body, into its reality” (PN §375/Z). In other words, the animal becomes 
habituated to its own existence, inured to the particularities that comprise its singular reality, 
including those that drive specific vital processes through which it maintains its body. Because 
the animal’s activity becomes “deadened and ossified,” the animal achieves an “abstract and 
immediate” universality through this habit of living (PN §375).  
The attempt to achieve universality in natural death achieves only abstract, partial success 
because the attempt is grounded in the animal’s natural externality: its body. Because the habit of 
living grants the animal universality through bodily alteration, it is dependent on the animal’s 
bodily externality. By contrast, Hegel asserts that a complete success, concrete universality, must 
be achieved by a “sublation of externality,” in which the individual achieves universality not by 
altering, but by negating, yet preserving its bodiliness; for instance, the human mind 
“distinguishes itself from nature” through thought (PM §381/Z).20 This concrete universality is 
not a possibility for the nonrational animal. For instance, since the habit of living is expressed 
through the animal’s natural body, the animal’s individuality is not distinguished from its 
naturalness: the universality represented by the animal’s body cannot be concrete universality 
 
19 Hegel also includes sexual death here, which is experienced by “lower animal organisms” after reproducing (PN 
§369/Z). 
20 For further discussion of the difference between concrete and abstract universals, see Stern (2007).  
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insofar as the body representing it is merely natural. Though the animal individual attains the 
“identity of the universal” in this habit, representing its genus through its embodiment, it ceases 
to partake in the particular vital processes of its genus and thus can only represent its universality 
abstractly through death (PN §376).  
Hegel’s name for the habituation involved in natural death is the habit of living. This 
specific habit appears also in the “Anthropology”: before exalting habituation as an “essential 
feature” of the mind, Hegel adds that “it is the habit of living which brings on death, or, albeit in 
a wholly abstract way, is death itself” (PM §410/A). Crucially, Hegel also connects the fatal 
habit of living to rational life in “The Animal Organism,” in that his foremost example of this 
habit utilizes humans: “old people dwell more and more within themselves and their kind, and 
their general ideas and conceptions tend to occupy their interest to the exclusion of what is 
particular” (PN §375/Z).21 Hegel takes the habituation that results in death to be inseparable from 
the general habituation that makes rational life possible. 
Given that the habit of living is shared by rational and nonrational animals, McCumber’s 
claim that habituated organization is only fatal for nonrational animals cannot be correct. 
Further, this habit of living cannot be separated from the general habituation displayed in human 
life. In the “Anthropology,” Hegel claims that the abstract universality obtained in the habit of 
living is shared by all habits, as the soul “makes itself into abstract universal being” in 
habituation (PM §410). Generally, the abstract universality of habituation follows from the 
individual’s liberation from particularities: in habits of hardening, for instance, particular 
sensations are still sensed, but they are “reduced to an externality and immediacy; the soul’s 
universal being maintains its abstract being-for-self in it, and … other purposes and activity, are 
 
21 Hegel also describes the habit of living in the Philosophy of Right, in which a human’s complete habituation to 
life entails a “loss of interest” that amounts to “mental or physical death” (PR §151/A). 
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no longer involved in it” (PM §410/A). The habit of living seems to be an extreme example of 
hardening, as the individual becomes inured to all particularities.  
Hegel’s treatment of the habit of living demonstrates that habituation is a natural power 
shared by all animals. The habit of living, for instance, seems to be the inevitable result of an 
animal repeating the same vital processes throughout life. One becomes habitually inured to 
particularities through repeated exposure and, for world-directed activities, “the production of 
habit appears as practice” (PM §410). Whether rational or nonrational, an animal that lives long 
enough will eventually sense, feel, and participate in repeated events, such that the particularities 
of these events will no longer be of concern. Understanding that habituation is a power shared by 
all animals, we must now determine why Hegel thinks this power yields different results for 




3 HABITUATION AS A REALIZATION OF ANIMALITY 
Thus far, I have argued that Hegel’s treatment of habituation in the lives of rational and 
nonrational animals suggests that habituation is the same power for each. However, to maintain 
coherence, my interpretation of the Encyclopedia must be able to answer two questions. The first 
regards the omission of habituation in merely animal life up until natural death: why does Hegel 
discuss animal habituation only in this one instance? In contrast to the emphasized role of 
habituation in human life, Hegel’s discussion of non-human animal habituation is extremely 
selective. One might conclude from this contrast that human and non-human animal habituation 
cannot be the same power.  
The second question regards the importance of habituation to rationality: if nonrational 
animals possess the power of habituation, how is habituation related to rationality? The 
“Anthropology” attributes the achievement of consciousness to habituation, and it is this 
consciousness that “posits itself as reason” and “has immediately awoken to becoming self-
knowing-reason” (PM §387). For Hegel, consciousness and reason are necessarily connected: 
because consciousness is the result of the soul’s sublation of natural bodiliness, it reveals the 
rational mindedness of the human soul.22 However, if non-human animals are capable of forming 
habits, but do not attain consciousness, then the power of habituation alone, while playing an 
important role in rational life, cannot be a sufficient condition for it. To answer these questions, I 
must first consider what Hegel’s conception of rationality entails: explicating Hegelian 
rationality will result in a better understanding of how the power of habituation could be the 
 
22 “Reason forms the substantial nature of mind” (PM §387/Z). The three sections of “Subjective Mind” each 
describe a dimension of rational mindedness: the task of the “Anthropology,” for instance, is to demonstrate the 
abstract universality of the mind. Because attaining actual soul and, by extension, consciousness, is necessary for the 
developments of mind Hegel describes in the following sections, there is a direct link between the habituation of 
human life and rationality.   
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same power for rational and nonrational animals, yet play considerably different roles in the lives 
of each. To elucidate Hegel’s picture of rational life, I will turn to Matthew Boyle’s discussion of 
two common conceptions of rationality. Though Boyle locates these conceptions in 
contemporary philosophy of mind, he also considers their roots in historical traditions that Hegel 
addresses similarly.23 
 
3.1 Theories of Rationality 
Boyle distinguishes between additive and transformative theories of rationality. Additive theories 
portray rationality as a single power in humans that provides “the capacity to monitor and 
regulate” animal powers like sight and desire (Boyle 2016: 2, 5).24 Human beings are rational 
animals insofar as they possess animal powers and an additional power of rationality that 
regulates their animal powers. When cats, dogs, and human beings desire food, the same power 
of desire is operating in all three. Of course, human beings are unique in their eating, as there are 
conceptual dimensions to human experience: for instance, humans can be aware of their meal’s 
nutritional content. The additive theorist holds that these concepts are added to human 
experience by rationality: like cats and dogs, human beings can desire something without the 
power of rationality playing a role in this process (2016: 22). Rationality, then, is a power unique 
to humans and external to the animal powers possessed by all three. 
In contrast, transformative theorists affirm McDowell’s assertion that rational animals are 
“animals whose natural being is permeated by rationality” (1996: 85). Boyle takes this assertion 
 
23 Boyle describes additive and transformative theories of rationality along Cartesian and Aristotelian lines, 
respectively (2016: 22). The connection between Aristotle and transformative theories of rationality is made 
rigorously in Boyle’s “Essentially Rational Animals” (2012: 395). Notably, Hegel begins the Philosophy of Mind by 
expressing his desire to vindicate Aristotle’s work on the soul (PM §378). I consider this connection between Hegel, 
Aristotle, and Boyle further in Section 5. 
24 See Velleman for an explicit example of an additive conception of rationality (2000: 11-2). 
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to mean that rationality is not a single power, but instead a different way in which animal powers 
are realized: animal powers are actualized in one way for nonrational animals and in another way 
for rational animals (2016: 5). This is not to say that the animal powers of humans begin as 
nonrational powers and are later literally transformed to be rational; instead, rationality 
transforms “what is to be an animal,” such that rationality denotes a different way of being an 
animal, rather than an additional trait (Boyle 2012: 410). For instance, human desire is 
qualitatively different from the desire of nonrational animals. When human beings feel disgust 
rather than desire at the prospect of eating dog food, this is not because a power of rationality 
regulates their desire, but rather because desire itself is “transformed” in humans: factors like 
social norms or awareness of the conditions in which dog food is made become a part of human 
desire itself. Crucially, these factors have their basis in rational concepts. Further, human beings 
can desire something primarily for a conceptual reason, such as a flavorless meal with 
unparalleled nutritional content. Because human animal powers are permeated by rationality, a 
human activity, like eating, is qualitatively different from a cat’s eating. The transformative 
conception of rationality thus specifies two distinct realizations of animal powers: a rational 
realization, witnessed in human beings, and a nonrational realization, witnessed in non-human 
animals. 
Since the transformative theorist takes all animal powers to be qualitatively different in 
human beings, Boyle holds that the difference between rational and nonrational life-forms 
becomes unmistakably a “difference in kind” (2012: 395).25 While an additive theorist might also 
 
25 Following Thompson, a life-form delimits “what states of affairs” would be proper for an organism (2015: 718). 
The life-form of a cat, for instance, entails being carnivorous, having four legs, and producing several offspring at a 
time. It is not the case that all members of a life-form must enter these states of affairs; many cats are spayed or 
neutered. However, it holds true that giving birth to litters, or contributing to these litters, is a state of affairs typical 
of the life-form “cat.”  
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claim that humans are different in kind from non-human animals, the additive conception does 
not preclude understanding rationality as a difference in degree between humans and non-human 
animals: while humans have one additional power of reason, this power is on par with other 
powers shared with non-human animals, as well as any powers that are only enjoyed by non-
human animals. Further, if reason is simply an additional power in human beings, then the 
difference made by rationality does not necessarily affect all aspects of an animal’s life. For 
instance, if animal desire is the same for both humans and cats, then there can be instances in 
which each party’s desire for a food item is identical. By contrast, the transformative conception 
of rationality necessitates a complete difference in kind, in which even the simplest occurrences 
of human desire are qualitatively different from the desire of other animals.  
The claim that there is a difference in kind between rational and nonrational animals may 
strike one as unwarranted or as having worrisome implications: for instance, one might worry 
that emphasizing a rational difference in kind implies an exaltation of “human beings above all 
other living creatures” (Boyle 2012: 424).26 However, the transformative conception of 
rationality does not necessitate any claims about the superiority of rational animals per se. Boyle 
clarifies that a transformative theory only entails that accounts of human animal powers must be 
understood on their own terms, or in their role of “supporting a specifically rational form of life” 
(2012: 424).  
In the remainder of this section, I argue that Hegel, in light of his discussion of 
habituation, should be read as providing a transformative theory of rationality. The reader does 
not need to be convinced that the rational difference in kind is real to accept my argument that 
Hegel is best read along these lines. However, highlighting the strengths of this conception will 
 
26 In “Essentially Rational Animals” Boyle considers objections to the difference in kind suggested by 
transformative theories in further detail (2012: 416-425). 
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demonstrate why bringing it to bear on Hegel is worthwhile. The salience of the rational 
difference in kind becomes clearer when attention is shifted from assertions about human and 
animal minds to the states of affairs relevant to different forms of life. While many nonrational 
animals can be attributed senses, behaviors, and intelligence, there is a qualitative difference 
between states of affairs we can expect in the lives of nonrational and rational animals. This is 
most evident in robust human sociality: while other animals could be understood as having some 
form of social relations, one can discern unique social developments, like markets, governments, 
and education systems, for which it is typical for human beings to participate in. For instance, 
human beings are a life-form whose typical state of affairs involves at least casually making 
judgments about animals as members of life-forms. While one might have reason to think other 
animals are capable of similar judgments, these nonrational animals do not appear to create 
records of these categorizations or dispute with one another over the details of these 
categorizations. Given the stark differences between the states of affairs typical of human life 
and the lives of non-human animals, there is reason to consider the difference made by 
rationality as a difference in kind. 
 
3.2 Transformative Habituation 
The functions Boyle associates with rationality are comparable to the role Hegel ascribes to 
habituation in rational life. The habit of seeing provides a clear example: in human beings, the 
sensation of sight, available to nonrational animals, is connected habitually with rational 
determinations like intellect, a stage of thinking that “works up the recollected representations 
into genera, species, laws … in general into the categories” (PM §467). The habitual unity in 
human sight makes the act of seeing a conceptual act: upon seeing a lawnmower, the unity of 
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determinations allows for my immediate awareness that the object before me can be categorized 
precisely as a lawnmower.27  
Following Boyle, we can consider whether this habituated difference between rational 
and nonrational sight is indicative of additive or transformative rationality. An additive reading 
of the development of rational life in the Encyclopedia would hold that habituation is a power 
unique to, or added onto, human animality that grants rationality. As I previously noted, some 
readers take Hegel to separate human habituation from any aspect of animal life, thus suggesting 
that Hegel’s conception of rationality is additive.28 I have argued that Hegel’s discussion of 
habituation in animal life demonstrates that for him habituation is essentially the same power for 
rational and nonrational life. However, someone who takes Hegel to provide an additive theory 
of rationality could object that, while a form of habituation exists in nonrational animal life, this 
habituation is a different, limited power from the habituation added to humans that allows for 
rationality. While Hegel does not explicitly make this claim, the additive interpretation could 
take Hegel’s sole discussion of non-human animal habituation in natural death as implicit 
evidence. To avoid an impasse, I will argue that Hegel’s treatment of rationality necessarily 
presupposes a transformative, rather than additive, conception of rationality, in which thorough 
habituation entails the realization of rational animality.  
For Hegel to be considered an additive theorist of rationality, he would need to hold that 
there is an additional power, such as habituation, that rational animals possess that can monitor 
their animal powers. However, Hegel is hostile to descriptions of mind as “a mere aggregate of 
 
27 Hegel elaborates that the conceptuality in intellect is still incomplete when considered alone. In intellect, “the 
object falls apart into the form and the content… the content is indifferent to its form, while in rational or conceptual 
cognition the content produces its form from its own self” (PM §467/Z). 
28 Pinkard claims that, for Hegel, the difference between animality and rational animality “is marked by the fact that 
the soul can acquire habits” which can operate as rules for activity in human agency (2012: 29). Pinkard nonetheless 
associates Hegelian rationality with Boyle’s transformative view, albeit without reference to habituation (2017: 12).  
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independent forces, each of which only interacts with the others, hence is only externally related 
to them” (PM §378/Z). Throughout “Subjective Mind,” Hegel describes different dimensions of 
human experience, like sensation, as determinations. Though he theoretically isolates these 
determinations to describe aspects of human mindedness, he denies that these determinations can 
be isolated or operate independently in human experience: 
Determinations and stages of the mind, by contrast, are essentially only moments, states, 
determinations in the higher stages of development. As a consequence of this, a lower 
and more abstract determination of the mind reveals the presence in it, even empirically, 
of a higher phase… when lower stages are under consideration, it becomes necessary, in 
order to draw attention to them in their empirical existence, to refer to higher stages in 
which they are present only as forms. (PM §380) 
 
The determinations involved in rational experience are interdependent aspects of its totality. 
Hegel’s assertion that “higher phases” are present in any consideration of lower determinations 
means that lone determinations cannot be understood independently in rational, perceptual 
experience: for example, in human sensation, “we can find all the higher phases of the mind as 
its content or determinacy” (PM §380). While many animals could see a microwave, an adult 
human cannot see this microwave without immediate conceptual consideration of this object, 
granted by intellect. Human sight, as a habitual unity, involves immediate awareness of what the 
seen object entails for human life: a human’s sight of the microwave includes immediate 
awareness of what the timer is counting down to, the relationship between these numbers, and 
the fact that it is heating an object for consumption. The immediacy of this conceptual 
information makes it impossible for a human to see the microwave free of concepts, as a non-
human animal does. If humans cannot sense without corresponding rational determinations, then 
habituation is not a power that externally monitors sight. Rather, since Hegel describes human 
sight as a habitual unity of sensation and further determinations, habituation transforms what it 
means for humans to see in the first place. 
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It is not only sensations that are transformed by habituation: for Hegel, even the most 
basic aspects of rational, human life are products of habituation. Standing upright, for instance, is 
a habitual activity: an individual’s posture is “made by his will into a habit, an immediate, 
unconscious posture” (PM §410/A). While nonrational animals are said to be driven by instinct, 
or “purposive activity acting unconsciously,” Hegel describes all characteristic activities of 
human life as products of habituation, even those which are enacted unconsciously (PN §360). 
Accordingly, because the stage of actual soul is the product of habituation, it can be described as 
the “first appearance” of mind, and thus the onset of human life; for this reason, even relatively 
simple human behavior, like upright posture, laughing, and weeping, already possess the 
“spiritual tone” of habituation (PM §411/A). This spiritual tone demonstrates a departure from 
mere nature: while the behavior of non-human animals is driven by instinct, human beings 
demonstrate mindedness indicative of the realm of Spirit.29 Throughout the “Anthropology,” 
Hegel is silent on what role, if any, instinct plays in human life, marking habituation as not 
simply a power in human individuals, but the very basis of the human life-form.30 Having 
habituation as this basis constitutes a crucial difference: because basic human activities are 
habitual, rather than instinctual, humans can bring them under their consideration, thus revising 
their second nature.31 For instance, while Hegel takes crying and laughter to be products of 
 
29 For Hegel, Spirit is “the goal of Nature” (§PN 376/Z). Subjective Mind aims to demarcate Spirit as individual, 
human subjectivity. In this context, Hegel’s attribution of a spiritual tone to even basic elements of habituation in the 
“Anthropology” marks a crucial transition from mere Nature to Spirit (§PM 387). 
30 What would seem to be a lack of instinct in Hegel’s discussion of human life results in children demonstrating “a 
far greater dependency and need than animals” (§PM 396/Z). In this discussion of early human life, Hegel neither 
affirms nor denies instinct in human beings. The child is merely said to possess sensation and feeling until 
“becoming an actual human being” by forming basic habits and grasping the external world’s actuality (§PM 
396/Z).  
31 Importantly, this rational capacity to revise second nature does not allow for a return to a hypothetical first nature; 
while humans can revise the conceptual dimensions of sight, such as when they learn more about a concept, they 
cannot remove habituated conceptuality from sight altogether. 
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habituation for human development, someone who works at a funeral parlor must develop habits 
that obviate either outburst on the job. Instinct does not suffice for robust, human sociality. 
While these early instances of habituation play a role comparable to the instincts of 
nonrational animals, they amount to a difference in kind between rational and nonrational 
animals. The thorough habituation enjoyed by human beings grants them access to conceptuality 
as well as the rational ability to bring habits under consideration and adjust them. Further, this 
difference in kind only becomes more apparent in what Hegel calls “more perfect” instances of 
habituation (PM §411/A), such as the habits of ethical life, which I visit in Section 4. However, 
even at the basic levels of posture and sight, Hegel’s construal of the differences between instinct 
and habituation provide good reason to adopt a transformative reading of Hegel. Because 
habituation is both a natural, animal power and a prerequisite for rational activity, the thorough 
habituation of human life amounts to a rational realization of animality. 
 
3.3 Nonrational Instinct and Rational Habituation 
I now return to the questions considered at the outset of this section. The first question was, why 
does Hegel discuss non-human animal habituation only in the case of natural death? Hegel’s 
selective discussion of natural death is a product of his general aim in “The Animal Organism,” 
which is to provide a general description of nonrational animal life-forms.32 Because nonrational 
animals have instinct as the basis of their activity, natural death is the only point at which 
habituation would become inevitable: if an animal avoids other types of death, habituation 
appears as the “inborn germ of death” (PN §375). Other, contingent habits can be formed: for 
instance, in order to receive food, a dog might habituate to sitting uncomfortably if that’s what its 
 
32 In The Animal Organism, Hegel briefly considers some specific species, such as butterflies (PN §369/Z). 
However, Hegel’s primary concern is non-human animal life in general. 
23 
owner demands. Though the dog’s behavior is habitual, as the dog has been trained to tolerate 
this discomfort, this habituation is in the service of its instinctual pursuit of food and largely 
circumstantial. A nonrational animal could end up relying on instinct, rather than habituation, for 
its entire life. For human beings, however, habituation plays a constant role in rational life, as all 
basic human activity, from standing upright to thought itself, requires habituation. Accordingly, 
the life of a rational being involves thorough habituation regardless of particular circumstances.  
The second question was, if habituation is not sufficient for the achievement of rational 
life, what exactly is its role? Following the transformative conception of rationality I have 
attributed to Hegel, we can take a process of thorough habituation, rather than mere possession 
or employment of the power of habituation, to be the sufficient condition for rationality. Because 
actual soul and human consciousness are attained only once the soul’s “bodiliness has been 
thoroughly trained and made its own,” it is this thoroughness that transforms human animality 
(PM §411). Since non-human animals have instinct as the basis of their life-form, they do not 
need to undergo thorough habituation. Humans are a life-form whose proper state of affairs 
necessitates thorough habituation.33 Consciousness, or “abstract universality in so far as it is for 
abstract universality,” reveals the transformed relationship that rational animals have with the 
abstract universality granted by habituation: because humans thoroughly habituate to their 
environment, it is possible for the individual to develop a self that “excludes… the natural 
totality of its determinations as an object, as a world external to it,” in contrast to the nonrational 
 
33 Human beings, like any life-form, do not always attain their proper or typical state of affairs. For instance, Hegel 
claims that a human being who fails to properly habituate suffers derangement, “a disease of the mind and body 
alike” (PM §408/Z). While this individual, in its mindedness, is a human being, she has not instantiated the thorough 
habituation that exemplifies the human form of life. Crucially, members of a life-form do not fail to be members of 
this life-form by failing to demonstrate a characteristic of it. Following Thompson, there is a wider context to 
consider when determining whether an organism is a member of a life-form: the fact that most mayflies die prior to 
breeding does not change the fact that the proper state of affairs for the life-form “mayfly” entails breeding and 
dying shortly after (2008: 67).  
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animal, which suffers the “limitation of sensation” alone and cannot reach this conception of self 
(PM §412/Z). Further, because humans have habituation, rather than instinct, as the basis of their 
activities, they develop and revise habits with respect to uniquely rational dimensions of their 
life. Proper rational life thus requires not only the habituation that results in actual soul, but also 
the continual development of habits within human sociality, such as the habits of ethical life. The 
difference in kind Hegel attributes to rational life, as well as the persisting importance of 
habituation to these rational developments, can be elaborated further through Hegel’s discussions 

















4 THE RATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF CONFLICT 
Having understood that Hegel’s treatment of the power of habituation suggests a transformative 
conception of rationality, one can begin to appreciate the role habituation plays in both the 
struggle for recognition and the human sociality that follows. To demonstrate the importance of 
habituation, I first consider Hegel’s discussion of animal violence in the Philosophy of Nature; 
according to this discussion, conflict in non-human animal life is devoid of satisfactory 
resolution, thus rendering non-human animal life anxious and unsafe. Then, I look to the struggle 
for recognition, first as it appears in the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit and then with the 
important clarifications made in the “Phenomenology” of the Encyclopedia. While the perpetual 
anxiety typical of this animal life demonstrates through contrast the significance of the struggle 
of recognition, this rational conflict, in turn, highlights the inadequacy Hegel attributes to 
nonrational life in nature. Further, understanding rational and nonrational life-forms in terms of 
one another will elucidate reasons to reject a popular dichotomy associated with the struggle for 
recognition: many readers assert that, by entering this struggle, a human being foregoes the 
species imperatives of her life, which a non-human animal would instinctively protect at all 
costs, for the sake of her commitment to independence.34 Against this dichotomous view, I argue 
that Hegel does not take humans to be deprioritizing their species imperatives by partaking in 
this struggle. Rather, Hegel employs the struggle for recognition to demonstrate that what it 
means for rational animals to have species imperatives in the first place differs in kind from the 
species imperatives of their nonrational counterparts. 
 
 
34 See Pippin (2011) and Brandom (2019) for readings of Hegel that emphasize this dichotomy. Pippin characterizes 
life before the struggle as an individual simply being “an exemplar of the species requirements of [one’s] species” 
(2011: 31). 
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4.1 Nonrational Violence 
At first glance, Hegel’s discussion of violent death in “The Animal Organism” presents an 
anomaly. In total, Hegel broaches four types of animal death, including natural death. Each form 
of death is said to be incited by a disparity between an individual animal’s singularity and its 
universality, and this disparity is partially overcome in abstract universality; in natural death, for 
instance, the disparity arises from the animal’s inability as a singular being to represent its 
universality, and the habit of living is adopted to achieve an abstract universality. Initially, 
violent death is characterized similarly: once a species develops “to the point of singularity,” an 
individual of that species “distinguishes itself from others in and through its own self, and 
through the negation of them is for itself. The natural fate of the individuals in this hostile 
relationship, in which others are reduced to an inorganic nature, is a violent death” (PN §370). 
An animal actualizes its species not simply as a member of the species, but also as an individual, 
living being; the animal is an individual in virtue of its self-certainty as a being that produces 
itself through vital processes (PN §366). Because animals are individuated, they feel hostility 
toward others: individuals, even of the same species, appear as inorganic nature. However, 
despite Hegel’s use of language which suggests a disparity between singularity and universality, 
violent death neither requires nor abstractly resolves such a disparity.  
While the hostility that precedes violent death originates from the singularity of animal 
individuals, a violent death itself does not necessarily involve tension between the individual and 
its universality. In principle, members of the same species could kill one another to affirm their 
singularity, but Hegel does not make any claim that a violent death must be the result of a 
conflict within the species. Taking the idea of “violent death” outside the context of Hegelian 
philosophy, we might expect there to be other, more probable causes for violent death from 
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outside a species, such as natural predators and natural disasters. Citing Cuvier, Hegel claims 
that an individual animal is distinguished by its “weapons,” like teeth and claws, through which 
it “establishes and preserves itself” (PN §370/A). However, insofar as these weapons are traits 
specific to the individual’s life-form, the instantiation of these traits seems to distinguish the 
individual from members of other species more than from members of its own species. 
Accordingly, the “natural fate” Hegel attributes to animals in their singularity does not describe a 
disparity that can be resolved within the species, but rather emphasizes the perennial threats that 
characterize the lives of non-human animals as “insecure, anxious and unhappy” in a “wholly 
alien” environment (PN §370/A).   
Hegel claims that the disparity associated with violent death can only be resolved for 
non-human animals, albeit abstractly and partially, in sexual reproduction. For Hegel, 
reproduction is “the highest point of living nature”: “here, each of the two sexes senses in the 
Other not an alien externality but its own self, or the genus common to them both” (PM 
§381/Z).35 Because reproduction is both an activity outlined by the individuals’ life-form and 
requires its participants to be of the same species, it necessitates a resolution to the tension 
between singularity and universality that violent death cannot. However, this resolution through 
reproduction also amounts to a failure: reproduction can only be the realization of the genus “in 
principle,” since its product, the offspring, is another singular being, “destined to develop into 
the same natural individuality, into the same difference and perishable existence” (PN §369). 
Like in natural death, the resolution of the disparity between the animal’s singularity and 
 
35 The sexual relation is discussed as a form of death in the Philosophy of Nature alongside violent death, albeit one 
that only “lower animal organisms,” like butterflies, suffer (PN §369/Z). Notably, contemporary translations alter 
Hegel’s order of discussion: while the translation I cite throughout (Hegel 2004) places the sexual death paragraphs 
before violent death, the editor notes that Hegel initially placed violent death prior to sexual death (PN §370). Given 
the discussion I reference in the Philosophy of Mind (PM §381/Z), Hegel’s initial ordering seems most apt: violent 
death introduces the hostility that animals experience in their individualization, and the sexual relation (which, for 
some, results in death) provides a resolution to this hostile individuality. 
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universality achieves only an abstract universality. Additionally, this resolution does not occur 
within violent conflict, and it fails to change the fact that non-human animal existence is 
saturated with danger. 
The failure to thoroughly resolve the disparity seen in the violent conflict of nonrational 
animals is to be expected given Hegel’s treatment of nature: even though non-human animal life 
is the “most perfect form” of nature, it is only the mind that succeeds in producing “the 
individuality that is universal in and for itself” insofar as it “distinguishes itself from nature” in 
consciousness (PM §381/Z). “Almost less even than the other spheres of Nature, can the animal 
world exhibit within itself an independent, rational system of organization” (PN §370/A). To 
understand this failure more plainly, we must consider what Hegel takes a progressive conflict 
between members of a species to look like. In his discussion of the vital processes of non-human 
animals and “perfect” human animals, Hegel claims that, “in the human organism, these 
processes are developed in the fullest and clearest way, this highest organism therefore presents 
us with a universal type, and it is only in and from this type that we can ascertain and explain the 
meaning of the undeveloped organism” (PN §352/Z). Because animality is transformed in its 
rational realization, the struggle between human beings will inform us of the potential 
significance behind risking natural life.36  
 
4.2 Rational Struggle 
Unlike the violence of non-human animal life, the struggle for recognition between human 
beings in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit successfully articulates a conflict between an 
 
36 “What belongs to nature as such lies behind the mind; it is true that the mind has within itself the entire content of 
nature, but the determinations of nature are in the mind in a radically different way from that in which they are in 
external nature” (PM §381/Z).  
29 
animal’s singularity and the universality of its genus. Because the struggle must necessarily 
occur between self-conscious beings, it necessarily involves two human beings, rather than 
beings from two different species, for instance. Hegel claims that, prior to the development of 
self-consciousness, consciousness takes objects of experience to be for-itself. Because 
consciousness focuses on external objects, “what is true for consciousness is something other 
than itself”; in self-consciousness, the self, or the “I,” becomes its own object: “being for-itself 
and being-for-an-other are one in the same” (PS §166). Hegel describes self-consciousness as 
desire, as self-consciousness consumes the worldly objects it encounters, sublating these external 
items in hopes of demonstrating certainty of itself as the “truth” of the external world, or the 
independent being for which the world exists as means (PS §175). This process of sublating 
objects, however, only provides temporary satisfaction: because the objects are consumed in the 
desire of self-consciousness, the certainty they provide cannot last much longer than the objects 
themselves. These instances of desire and their satisfaction are not substantially different from 
the urges Hegel ascribes to merely animal life (PN §360). Though a transformative reading of 
Hegel must assert that there is a difference in kind present even in basic instances of human 
desire, the satisfaction required by self-consciousness must involve an unmistakable departure 
from nonrational animal nature in order to highlight and affirm the spiritual difference in kind 
that is crucial for Hegel.37 
The difference between the conflict of rational and nonrational animals becomes evident 
once self-consciousness encounters another self-consciousness. As worldly objects cannot grant 
 
37 While Section 3 used the power of desire to illustrate the transformative difference in kind between rational and 
nonrational animals, Hegel’s own use of the term “desire” is specific to human beings. While he describes what we 
might call merely animal desire in the terms “need” or “urge” in the Philosophy of Nature (PN §360), he saves the 
term “desire” for his discussion of human beings in Subjective Mind (PM §426). In the Encyclopedia, we might take 
“desire” as denoting the rational realization of urge. 
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the self-conscious subject lasting satisfaction, this subject discovers that satisfaction must be 
gained through recognition by another self-consciousness (PS §178). The satisfaction that 
follows from being recognized as a self-conscious being demonstrates a desire entirely separate 
from the satisfactions of merely animal life. Once two subjects encounter one another, each 
presents a threat to the other: because each self-consciousness being takes itself to be the external 
world’s truth, and not a mere object, encountering a similarly-constituted being reminds them 
that they themselves are also connected to the natural world in their bodily externality. 
Furthermore, each subject, in virtue of being self-conscious, has equal claim to being “the 
essential being” of the external world, causing uncertainty as to which subject deserves this title 
(PS §180). Consequently, each subject seeks to supersede her rival subject in a manner similar to 
her prior sublation of objects through desire. However, the attempt to supersede the other differs 
in this conflict, as the subject understands that, by engaging in this struggle, she can demonstrate 
her self-conscious independence and make the other subject recognize her as such. Crucially, this 
struggle for recognition can be nothing short of a “life-and-death struggle”: to truly demonstrate 
their independence as the truth of the external world, the subjects must risk their lives in combat 
(PS §187-8). If either subject stopped short of staking life itself, she would fail to demonstrate 
the sincerity of her commitment to her belief that, as self-consciousness, she is independent from 
the natural, external world, which includes the body as the external foundation of her life.  
At first, the result of the struggle for recognition is unequal and does not demonstrate a 
thorough departure from the contingencies of nonrational animal life. One subject avoids death 
by surrendering her independent existence: in preserving her life, she becomes the bondsman and 
is reduced to “thinghood” (PS §189). The bondsman labors for and lives in fear of the victorious 
subject, the master, who has proven her independence (PS §190). In addition to being unequal, 
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this relationship is unstable, and the fruits of the master’s victory are short-lived. While the 
master sought to demonstrate her independence, she is now dependent on the laboring 
bondsman, who mediates the master’s relationship to the external world. Further, because the 
master regards the bondsman as unessential, rather than as an independent, self-conscious 
subject, the recognition the bondsman provides cannot satisfy the master (PS §191-92). The 
bondsman, despite her position of servitude, is in a position to develop as a human being. 
Because the bondsman feared for her life, she has a newfound appreciation for her external, 
bodily existence (PS §194). Additionally, through her work for the master, her relationship with 
the external world changes: instead of destructively sublating objects through desire, her work on 
the external world is constructive and “acquires an element of permanence” (PS §195). The 
moments of fear and work allow for desirous, self-consciousness to accept its necessary 
relationship with the external world. 
Rightfully, this struggle is often interpreted as an important point of departure for human 
beings from mere animal nature. This departure for rational life is often associated with subjects’ 
willingness to risk their lives: while a non-human animal would prioritize its survival as a living 
being, humans will risk their very existence for the sake of some other commitment.38 Pippin, for 
instance, holds that the struggle “establishes whose claims are in fact claims made by a subject 
rather than the expression of life’s imperatives because the struggle pushes the issue to the point 
where a complete indifference to life’s imperatives determines the result” (2011: 85). On this 
reading, species imperatives are something a human must ignore entirely to demonstrate their 
 
38 There is a curious tendency in the secondary literature to compare the relationship between human and merely 
animal life to aspects of Japanese culture, particularly in the ritual suicide of samurai (Kojève 1993: 161-2). This 
comparison has been made most recently by Robert Brandom: in various circumstances, samurai were expected to 
commit suicide, demonstrating their commitment to their code as essential to themselves; failure to do so “would be 
the suicide of the samurai, who would only be survived by an animal” (2019: 238). While this comparison is perhaps 
made hastily and may lack historical accuracy, it exemplifies the extent to which a tradition of reading Hegel holds 
animal life and human values to be diametrically opposed in the struggle for recognition. 
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rational capacity to make claims and commitments in the struggle for recognition. Insofar as the 
struggle is a necessary step toward human sociality, it certainly demonstrates the distinctiveness 
of rational human life. However, this sharp division between the imperatives of natural life and 
rational activity is hastily drawn. Turning to Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and 
habituation in the Encyclopedia and in the Philosophy of Right, we will see that the onset of 
human sociality is not a drastic departure from humanity’s animal nature, but rather the further 
realization of this nature through habituation. 
 
4.3 The Rational Difference in Kind 
To understand the importance of habituation to the struggle for recognition, we must first recall 
that the “Anthropology” establishes consciousness as a product of habituation as it is undergone 
by human beings (PM §412). The “Phenomenology” of the Encyclopedia comes directly after 
the “Anthropology,” tracing the developments of consciousness and self-consciousness. Because 
habituation works against an individual’s immersion in particularities and allows for the 
existence of consciousness, it is a prerequisite to these developments. The master-bondsman 
relationship is followed by the final stage of self-consciousness, universal self-consciousness: 
“the affirmative awareness of oneself in the other self,” and thus “absolute independence” 
insofar as each subject involved is “aware of its recognition in the free other, and is aware of this 
in so far as it recognizes the other and is aware that it is free” (PM §436). Because these 
individuals reciprocally recognize one another as free and independent, neither feels threatened 
by the other. The development of universal self-consciousness makes evident the contrast 
between nonrational animal life, in which animals experience perpetual anxiety in the face of 
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possible violence, and rational life, in which physical conflict and fear exist as necessary, albeit 
temporary, moments of development.  
In the Encyclopedia, Hegel is explicit that the stage of universal self-consciousness only 
becomes possible through a specific habit. The “habit of obedience,” developed by the 
bondsman, allows one to submit to “the genuinely universal, rational will that is in and for itself” 
(PM §435/Z). At first, total fear motivates the bondsman to submit to the master. This initial fear 
is hardly different from the fear pervading non-human animal life, and the ensuing work is 
contingent insofar as it follows from the arbitrary will of the master. However, the master-
bondsman relationship, while flawed, demonstrates the possibility for self-conscious beings to 
comply by means of their own habit, rather than an external source like terror. This does not 
mean that human beings who develop a habit of obedience always, unreflectively give in to 
demands made by anyone. Rather, through this habit, self-conscious beings are not hindered by 
their independence in cooperating with others. Hegel envisions this habit as operating in service 
of the rational will of universal self-consciousness: this habit allows those who have obtained 
“the capacity for self-government” through discipline to enter community and abide by universal 
law, which is “in and for itself rational” (PM §435/Z). Hegel asserts that it is through the mutual 
recognition of universal self-consciousness and submission to the rational will that human beings 
achieve freedom in sociality.  
The freedom that human sociality aims toward is crucially habitual as well. Because the 
master-bondsman relationship is a prerequisite to universal self-consciousness, Hegel considers 
it to be the beginning of “man’s social life, the beginning of states” (PM §433/A). In turn, the 
rationally organized state expedites the formation of liberatory habits. In the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel illustrates this habituated freedom through the example of patriotism. Through reliable 
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institutions, the state establishes a relationship of trust with its citizens. A patriotic citizen 
“habitually knows that the community is the substantial basis and end” (PR §268). This patriotic 
unity with the state affects daily behaviors. For instance, Hegel notes that a trusting citizen can 
adopt the habit of taking walks late at night without a second thought (PR §268/A).  
The patriotic habit of late-night walks demonstrates how the power of habituation broadly 
applies to various aspects of rational life. While the state protects its citizens, the citizens, as 
individual subjects, must habituate to this protection to fully appreciate it. On one hand, 
habituation plays the same liberatory role in these late-night walks as it does in non-human 
animal life: the habit, while mechanistic insofar as it can be employed without serious reflection, 
frees the individual from particularities she might otherwise fixate on, like the obviated 
possibility of natural dangers. Just as the habit of living inures an animal to all particularities of 
its life, leading to natural death, a habitual awareness of safety allows the citizen freedom from 
the particularities that, without a reliable state, she would have good reason to worry about.39 On 
the other hand, this habit requires rationality. In order to trust the state, a citizen must possess 
some sociopolitical knowledge of the various functions and powers the state possesses as well as 
confidence in its reliability (PR §269). Having habituation as the basis of their life-form, rational 
individuals can habitually accept the rational organization of the state and, in turn, enjoy the 
state’s catalyzation of the liberatory ease of habituation. 
Crucially, we do not need to share Hegel’s optimism for the state or its institutions to 
appreciate the core of his insight. The state, as a possibility, allows humans to develop habits that 
 
39 Of course, the state must truly be reliable for proper habituation. Novakovic differentiates “real” habits in Hegel, 
or those that provide genuine liberation, from “deformed” habits (2019: 889). Deformed habits would remain a form 
of second nature, but not provide ease to the individual. Here, we can think of a citizen having to walk home 
hurriedly or believing that she must avoid the police rather than rely on them when in danger. These instances of 
deformed habit suggest that the state’s institutions are unsatisfactory.  
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grant ease. By doing so, humans avoid the “perpetual violence and threat of dangers'' which 
characterize nonrational animal life (PN §370/A). This contrast highlights the rational difference 
in kind. As seen in the life-and-death struggle, human beings can experience the life-threatening 
danger that exists in animal life. Further, they can appreciate the gravity of this threat: the 
bondsman, for instance, must experience “absolute fear,” and not “some lesser dread,” to grasp 
the importance of her embodiment as a necessary aspect of her self-conscious existence, rather 
than something external to her (PS §196). However, while this terror is an unchanging aspect of 
non-human animal life, it is the catalyst for robust and beneficial sociality in human life.  
By considering Hegel’s discussion of violence in non-human animal life alongside the 
struggle crucial to human sociality, we can see how Hegel has made good on his promise that 
humans, as the “highest organism,” serve to elucidate “the meaning of the undeveloped 
organism,” or the nonrational animal as a broad life-form (PN §352/Z). For nonrational animals, 
conflict within a species is not necessitated. Further, because instinct already operates as the 
basis of animal life, habituation is circumstantial rather than thorough, such that animals can 
neither achieve consciousness nor, through the developments of consciousness, distance 
themselves from the dangers present in nature. While sexual reproduction provides some 
resolution to the disparity between an animal’s singularity and universality, this resolution is 
separate from violent conflict itself and only attains an abstract universality. The development of 
consciousness in human beings through habituation makes possible social developments which, 
in turn, reduce the anxieties of natural life and grant rational beings ease. The ease brought about 
by social progress allows for the mind to thoroughly distinguish itself from nature through 
activities like thought, which require habituation as their basis (PM §410/A). The significance of 
36 
conflict between rational life-forms allows for an understanding of what precisely conflict 
between nonrational life-forms fails to achieve. 
Because the habituation expected of human life is essential for the eventual successes of 
human conflict, it would be incorrect to assert that the life-and-death struggle displays a human 
individual’s choice of values or commitments over the imperatives of her species. Hegel stresses 
that “life points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness” (PS §172). Life, whether 
rational or nonrational, has this end, though only the former achieves it through a thorough 
habituation. Consequently, it would be a mistake to pit the rational capacity to make 
commitments against the species imperatives of rational animals. The capacity for rational 
beings to have commitments, like their commitment to independence, is not separate from the 
priorities delimited by their life-form. While the struggle for recognition illuminates a crucial 
development in which human beings must prioritize their claim to independence over the 
preservation of their life, this conflict is one between the species imperatives we can attribute to 
the rational realization of animality.  
The state of affairs Hegel attributes to human life demonstrates that the rational life-form 
delimits a multiplicity of species imperatives. These species imperatives, whether they involve 
the preservation of one’s life or the developments of consciousness, crucially involve 
habituation. A direct example of habituation’s relevance to the rational state of affairs appears in 
the habits of ethical life, which demonstrate “the content of freedom” as seen in patriotic habits: 
it is typical of human beings to habitually expect services from the rationally organized state, and 
it is liberating to have such expectations (PM §410/A). Hegel does not treat rational human 
activity and animal nature as mutually exclusive aspects of human life. Rather, Hegel treats 
habituation as a throughline connecting various stages of human development. Accordingly, 
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human beings do not defy their animal nature in the struggle for recognition, but instead display 
the realization of an animal nature that is different in kind from nonrational animals. 
Undergirded by habituation, human life exhibits a complex multiplicity of species imperatives 





















5 HEGEL AND THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF RATIONALITY 
Because I have constructed and defended my interpretation of Hegelian habituation through 
appeal to transformative theories of rationality, I must consider the possibility that bringing 
Boyle’s contemporary theory to bear on the Encyclopedia neglects crucial differences between 
the historical contexts of these thinkers and hastily conflates the frameworks they utilize. For 
instance, on the surface, there is a technical concern that follows from this interchange: while 
transformative theorists hold that animal powers are transformed in their rational realization, I 
have argued that Hegel regards habituation as essentially the same power in rational and 
nonrational life. This claim, held alongside my argument that the thorough habituation Hegel 
associates with rational life amounts to a transformation of animality for humans, produces a 
strange conclusion: habituation, despite being an animal power, is not transformed in human 
beings. If Hegel holds that some animal powers are not transformed in rational life, then he 
deviates from Boyle’s blueprint for transformative theories.40 
Though Hegel does not satisfy this specific requirement for a transformative theory of 
rationality, he nonetheless provides arguments for the underlying conclusion of transformative 
theories: rationality describes a unique realization of animality. Hegel’s proximity to 
transformative theories is evident not only in his discussion of habituation in rational and 
nonrational life but also in his appropriation of Aristotle’s work on the soul to delineate these 
forms of life.41 For Boyle, differences in kind between life-forms follow the “classical,” 
Aristotelian succession of vegetative, appetitive, and rational souls: each soul represents a “mode 
 
40 See Houlgate (2016) for discussion of Hegel’s deviation from the McDowellian conceptualism that provides the 
basis for Boyle’s transformative conception of rationality. 
41 See Ferrarin (2001) for discussion of Aristotle’s influence on Hegel. See Malabou in particular for discussion of 
Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotelian souls to his own, anthropological, ends (2005: 39).  
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of organization characteristic of life” (2012: 409).42 Hegel’s treatment of souls does not simply 
mirror Aristotle’s: while Hegel grants all living beings souls, he takes the proper actualization of 
the soul to only occur alongside the emergence of human life. Insofar as only the human soul is 
deemed “actual,” Hegel demonstrates, even more clearly than Aristotle, a commitment to the 
position that there is a difference in kind between humans, who attain rational mindedness, and 
all other life-forms in nature (PM §411). While Hegel’s arguments diverge from Boyle’s, Hegel 
nonetheless places himself in conversation with Boyle’s earliest, historical example of 
transformative theories, and his conception of rationality favors the general thesis of 

















Boyle suggests that additive theories of rationality enjoy an implicit popularity: because many 
believe that rational and nonrational animals share basic powers like sight, a common conclusion 
is that the difference between these life-forms must come from a “separate and additional” power 
(2016: 2-4). This implicit commitment might explain why readers of the Encyclopedia are 
reticent to attribute the habituation operative throughout human life to nonrational animals. I 
have argued that Hegelian habituation cannot be properly understood as a power unique to 
rational beings. While thorough habituation is necessary for rational life, this same power of 
habituation must, by Hegel’s lights, be essentially the same, natural power for nonrational animal 
life. My interpretation has significant consequences for how we should read both the 
Encyclopedia and Hegel’s work in general. Notably, humans are not rational beings that forgo 
their animality in a struggle for recognition. Rather, the life-and-death struggle reveals the 
nuances of what it means to be a rational animal. Because habituation is the basis of rational 
animality, humans must risk their lives in order to both arrive at the reciprocal recognition of 
proper human sociality and enjoy the liberatory ease of subsequent habituation. This risk is not a 
renunciation of the importance of animal life, but instead an important moment in rational animal 
life. 
This transformative reading of Hegel also exhibits the relevance of Hegel’s thought to 
contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. Namely, by understanding how thorough 
habituation amounts to a rational realization of animality, one sees how Hegel’s conception of 
rationality is in conversation with the transformative tradition of rationality explicated by Boyle. 
A goal of Hegel’s from the outset of Philosophy of Mind is “to disclose once more the sense of 
those Aristotelian books” in which Boyle locates the origin of transformative theories (PM 
41 
§378). Hegel’s discussion of habituation as both a possibility for animal life and a necessary, 
transformative power for rational life demonstrates that he is rightly considered a precursor to the 
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